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Unsolicited Commercial Telephone
Calls and the First Amendment: A
Constitutional Hangup
The telephone has become a fixture in the American home, provid-
ing instant access to a myriad of goods, services, and people. Never
slow to miss such a golden opportunity, purveyors of those goods and
services have turned the telephone into a formidable sales tool.' Esti-
mates of the number of telephone calls soliciting sales made per day
range as high as seven million.' Religious groups, charitable and civic
organizations, political organizations, and poll-takers have not over-
looked this valuable means of distributing their messages.3 Technology
has provided automated equipment capable of calling up to 1,000 num-
bers per day, playing a pre-recorded sales message, and taking orders,
all without a human attendant.4 In some cases, hanging up on the
machine does not disconnect the device from the telephone, causing a
variety of problems, including depriving an individual subscriber of a
service for which he or she pays.' The machinery used to place calls is
becoming even more sophisticated; one of the newer designs is capable
of recording responses to questions and varying the program played to
match those responses.6
The only option available to most telephone subscribers who wish to
avoid the interruptions caused by unsolicited telephone calls is the un-
listed telephone number. This option may not be particularly desirable
for the vast majority of individuals, however, since it effectively elimi-
nates many telephone calls that may be welcome.7 Additionally, the
1. National advertising agencies exist that specialize in telephone sales campaigns. One
such agency has used as many as 15,000 telephone solicitors in 550 market areas. See Note,
Unwanted Telephone Calls-A Legal Remedy?, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 379, 379 n.1 (1967).
2. 4 Revolt Against 'unk Calls," Bus. WEEK, Feb. 20, 1978, at 26 [hereinafter cited as A
Revolt].
3. See M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 176 (1964) [hereinafter cited as M. BREN-
TON]. Charities raise billions of dollars every year, much of which is solicited in the home. See id
at 199-200.
4. Foes of "Junk Calls" Go Into Action, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, March 27, 1978,
at 67 [hereinafter cited as Foes of "Junk Calls"].
5. In one admittedly extreme case, a Minneapolis woman whose mother suffered a heart
attack had to use a neighbor's telephone to summon aid because a call placed by an automated
dialer did not disconnect when she hung up her telephone. See id
6. See A Revolt, supra note 2, at 27.
7. A telephone directory is an essential instrumentality in connection with the peculiar
service which a telephone company offers for the public benefit and convenience. It is as
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unlisted telephone number provides no protection from the automated
sequential dialing equipment that can be programmed to dial every
number in a given exchange.' In reaction to the receipt of these un-
wanted calls, consumers have begun to apply pressure to legislatures
and regulatory agencies to do something about "junk calls." 9 In re-
sponse, although no significant action has yet been taken by Con-
gress, 10 investigations into the problem have commenced," and some
states have taken at least the first steps toward curtailing these calls.' 2
The problems posed by unsolicited telephone calls will become more
serious as technology provides more sophisticated equipment unless
there is a positive response to consumer pressure to regulate unsolicited
telephone calls. Since the content of these telephone calls has been
termed speech within the meaning of the first amendment,' 3 any regu-
lation must be able to withstand a challenge based on the first amend-
ment right to free speech. This comment will examine the degree of
protection afforded unsolicited commercial telephone calls, the limits
of the right of privacy of the telephone subscriber, and the amount of
protection from such calls the state can constitutionally provide to the
consumer in light of the developing commercial speech doctrine. As a
result of the analysis in this comment, it will be seen that regulation of
commercial speech is permissible if it is reasonable in time, place, and
manner and is based on the right to privacy in the home. Initially,
however, a review of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in
the area of commercial speech will be helpful in understanding the im-
pact of the first amendment on unsolicited telephone calls. Likewise, it
much so as is the telephone receiver itself, which would be practically useless. . . with-
out the accompaniment of such directories.
California Fireproof Storage Co. v. Brundige, 199 Cal. 185, 188, 248 P. 669, 670 (1926). Unlisted
numbers place an additional burden on telephone company personnel, who must act as an an-
swering service and contend with irate callers who cannot obtain a number for someone known to
have a telephone. Also, additional fees are charged to provide an unlisted telephone number. See
M. BRENTON, supra note 3, at 178.
8. See Foes of "Junk Calls," supra note 4, at 67.
9. By early 1978 the Federal Communications Commission had received about 1000 com-
plaints, most of them concerning the automatic dialer. See id
10. A telephone privacy bill backed by 87 representatives and six senators was introduced in
Congress early in 1978. Id
11. The White House Office of Telecommunications Policy and the Federal Communications
Commission have been looking into the problem. A Revolt, supra note 2, at 26.
12. In its 1978 session, the California Legislature enacted a law regulating automatic dialing-
announcing devices. CA . STATS. 1978, c. 877, at- (enacting CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§2821-
2825). In addition, the California Public Utilities Commission ordered adoption of a tariff virtu-
ally identical to the new law. Public Utilities Comm'n Decision No. 89397 (Sept. 19, 1978) (copy
on file at the Pacc Law Journal). See 10 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1978 CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATION 382 (1979). Other states, including Maryland, Virginia, Florida, Illinois, and Michi-
gan, have considered legislation in this area. Foes of "Junk Calls," supra note 4, at 67.
13. Advertising has been consistently treated as speech by the courts, although it has not
always enjoyed 'protected status. See, e.g, Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1951);
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
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will be necessary to briefly categorize the types of unsolicited telephone
calls one might receive to assess any state regulation of commercial
telephone calls. 14
UNSOLICITED TELEPHONE CALLS
The unsolicited telephone calls that give rise to consumer protest fall
into three classifications. The first classification contains those calls
that are intended to impart or elicit information--calls from polling
organizations and political groups. The second are those that seek do-
nations of time, money, or other forms of support for various civic,
charitable, or religious organizations. Both the informational and don-
ative types of calls would be given full protection under the first
amendment if they "contained factual material of clear public inter-
est."' 5 These types of speech are not under consideration in this com-
ment.'
6
The third classification of unsolicited telephone calls is composed of
those in which the caller is attempting to sell goods or services. It is this
third classification of calls that can be considered to be within the clas-
sification of speech that the courts have termed "commercial" and that
is the subject of this comment. As used here, unsolicited commercial
telephone calls are those in which the caller attempts to sell goods or
services at a profit. 7 It appears that commercial speech in general has
been given less protection by the United States Supreme Court 18 and
thus may be subject to more regulation than wholly protected speech;
but before that conclusion can be reached, it is necessary to explore the
history of the commercial speech area.
14. While there are many constitutional questions that may arise when dealing with the regu-
lation of commercial speech, the focus of this comment is limited to some of the first amendment
considerations necessary in order to frame a regulation that restricts access to private homes by
those who use the telephone as an advertising tool. Such issues as overbreadth and the impact of
the commerce clause will not be considered, as they are beyond the scope of this comment.
Clearly, there are problems concerning telephone calls placed on interstate lines that originate
outside California, which is one reason that many complaints and requests for action have been
directed at federal rather than state agencies.
15. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975).
16. Although the contents of both of these classifications of calls are protected by the first
amendment, the interests that must be considered in framing a restriction of political or religious
speech raise additional problems and areas of concern. While these calls may be subject to certain
kinds of regulation, other issues, such as prior restraint, equal protection, and freedom of religion,
are raised that are beyond the scope of this comment. See Comment, .4ssault upon Solitude-A
Remedy?, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 109, 121-22 (1970).
17. The United States Supreme Court has never specifically defined "commercial speech,"
but rather has merely assumed its existence. It is not necessary for the discussion contained herein
to formulate an all-inclusive definition of commercial speech, since under any circumstances such
speech is assumed to include notice that a product or service is for sale and a request that someone
purchase it.
18. See notes 58-67 and accompanying text infra.
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PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. History
Prior to 1976 purely commercial speech was commonly viewed as
unprotected by the first amendment since it was seen to fall into the
same nonfavored status as obscenity and "fighting words." 19 In Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen2 ° the United States Supreme Court first held that
commercial speech was unprotected by the first amendment. But
within one year of Chrestensen, the Court began to retreat from this
position.21
An analysis of the rise of commercial speech to protected status
shows that in very few cases was such speech actually unprotected.
Only in the door-to-door solicitation cases did the Court draw a clear
line based on the commercial content of the speech.22 In Martin v. City
of Struthers23 the Court invalidated a statute that forbade knocking on
a door or ringing a doorbell to distribute literature by finding that free-
dom of speech necessarily included the right to distribute that speech.24
Likewise, in situations involving the sale of religious literature, an ab-
solute ban on door-to-door activity has not been allowed by the
Court.25 In Breard v. Alexandria,26 however, an ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door solicitation without the prior consent of the homeowner
was found not to violate the first amendment.27 The Court in Breard
found the act of selling goods was not protected and distinguished Mar-
tin, stating that no commercial element had been involved in that
case.28 Even the dissent of Justice Black, arguing that freedom of the
press should protect Mr. Breard's magazine sellers, recognized that "the
present ordinance could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant'
who goes from door to door 'selling pots.' "29
The cases subsequent to Breard do not follow this strict view of com-
19. Compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951) and Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484-85 (1957) andChaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
20. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
21. The first signs of the weakening of the Chrestensen decision were in cases in which the
primary motive of the individual was noncommercial despite the solicitation of money. See Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (invalidating license tax on sales of religious litera-
ture as sales were incidental to dissemination of religious belief). See generally Comment, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment, 12 TuLSA L.J. 699, 700-03 (1977).
22. Compare Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) with Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951).
23. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
24. See id at 146.
25. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
26. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
27. Id at 641-45.
28. Id at 642-43.
29. Id at note accompanying text at 650 (Black, J., dissenting).
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mercial speech. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3" it was noted that
speech was not rendered commercial simply because it is in the form of
an advertisement." In addition, Justice Brennan found Chrestensen
did not render advertisements unprotected since the advertisement in
question did more than propose a commercial transaction.32 In 1973
the issue of first amendment protection for commercial speech was
again before the Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations.33 Pittsburgh Press argued that even if advertise-
ments and layouts were commercial speech, they were subject to a
higher level of protection than Chrestensen would suggest, and that
commercial speech should be protected.3 4 Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, found the argument unpersuasive since he viewed the ad-
vertisement as one for illegal commercial activity.35 Since the activity
was illegal, the advertisement could be regulated even if the speech it-
self were protected. In separate dissents, however, Justices Douglas
and Stewart argued that the advertising layouts should have been
granted first amendment protection and questioned the continuing va-
lidity of Chrestensen.36
In 1975 the unprotected status of commercial speech was dealt a
death blow in Bigelow v. Virginia,37 which invalidated a statute that
made the circulation of any publication that encouraged or promoted
abortion a misdemeanor.38 Bigelow had published an advertisement
dealing with the availability of abortions in New York.39 The Court
declared that the holding in Chrestensen was limited to its facts, that
Chrestensen merely upheld "a reasonable regulation of the manner in
which commercial advertising could be distributed," 40 and that the Vir-
ginia courts had erred in assuming that advertising had no first amend-
ment protection.4' Bigelow arguably could have been decided based on
the "clear public interest" in material communicating the availability
of abortions.42 The Court noted, however, that it was not deciding the
"extent to which constitutional protection is afforded commercial ad-
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Id at 265-66.
32. Id at 266.
33. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
34. See id at 388.
35. Pittsburgh Press Co. allowed employers to place advertisements in male and female help-
wanted columns. This was held by the Court to violate an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in
employment and was therefore illegal commercial activity. See id
36. See id at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
37. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
38. Id at 812-13.
39. Id at 811-12.
40. Id at 819.
41. See id at 818-20.
42. See id at 822.
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vertising under all circumstances and in the face of all kinds of regula-
tion."43 One year later, in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,' the Court squarely addressed the is-
sue of the existence of a first amendment cloak for commercial
speech.45
B. Factoring in Virginia Pharmacy
The landmark decision of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,46 raised commercial speech to
protected status47 and required that attempts to regulate such speech be
subjected to the standards of scrutiny established by the Court to pre-
vent violation of the first amendment.48
The Virginia Pharmacy decision involved a challenge by a consumer
group of a statute that prohibited the advertising of the prices of pre-
scription drugs and declared such advertising to be unprofessional con-
duct by a pharmacist of the type that could result in disciplinary
action.49 The Commonwealth of Virginia argued that the statute was a
valid exercise of the police power that protected the public health by
maintaining a high degree of professionalism in its pharmacists. 50 The
Commonwealth suggested that by allowing price advertising the stable
interpersonal relationships between pharmacists and customers would
be destroyed, and customers would shop for cut-rate prices at the ex-
pense of their health.5" It was further suggested that the cost of adver-
tising would actually raise the cost of drugs. 2 The primary argument
advanced by the Commonwealth, however, was that advertising of
prices was pure commercial speech, devoid of any political or ideologi-
cal content, and it therefore was not protected by the first amendment
and could be prohibited. 3
Speaking for the Court, Justice Blackmun found that the concept of
commercial speech as a totally unprotected class had been all but de-
stroyed by the Court in its decision in Bigelow v. Virginia.54 The speech
43. Id at 826.
44. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
45. Id
46. Id
47. See id at 762.
48. See id at 769-70.
49. See id at 751-52. The statute under attack defined unprofessional conduct by a pharma-
cist to include advertising the price of any drug that must be dispensed by prescription. The
possible penalties for a pharmacist found guilty of such conduct included fines, revocation or
suspension of one's license, or both. Id
50. See id at 766.
51. See id at 767-68.
52. See id at 768.
53. See id at 758.
54. Id at 759.
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in Bigelow had been found by the Court to have elements other than
pure commercialism, leaving a lingering doubt that pure commercial
speech was still not protected.5 The speech prohibited by the statute
under attack in Virginia Pharmacy, however, could not be found to be
anything other than a proposal for a purely commercial transaction,
56
leaving the issue squarely before the Court of whether speech, the con-
tent of which cannot be construed as anything other than commercial,
is wholly outside the protection of the first amendment. 7
In order to resolve this issue, the Court looked to the interests served
on both sides of the question. The purely economic motive of the ad-
vertiser, the interest of the public in the free flow of information gener-
ally, and the right of consumers to know "who is producing what
product for what reason and at what price"" all weighed on the side of
allowing price advertising. 59 On the side of prohibition were the desire
of the Commonwealth to maintain a high degree of professionalism in
its pharmacists60 and speculation that advertising would have an ad-
verse effect on prices. 6' Although these considerations were viewed as
adequate to justify regulation absent first amendment protection, 62 the
Court found them to be insufficient when balanced against the need of
the consumer for the information, particularly since the effect of the
regulation was total suppression of price information concerning pre-
scription drugs.63 Additionally, the Commonwealth already had the
means available to discipline any pharmacist whose conduct was detri-
mental to the public interest.' Thus, the Court refused to allow the
Commonwealth to keep the public ignorant of the price of prescription
drugs as a means of protecting it from such pharmacists. 65 Under Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, simply attaching the label "commercial speech" to a
communication is no longer sufficient to remove it from the protection
55. See 421 U.S. at 822.
56. See 425 U.S. at 760-61.
57. Justice Blackmun characterized the issue very simply: Is there any first amendment pro-
tection for the statement, "I will sell you X drug at Y price"? Id at 761.
58. See Id at 762-64.
59. See id The interest of the consumer in this information seems to weigh heavily with the
Court, which views that interest as perhaps keener than the interest in the day's most urgent
political debate. Id at 763.
60. See Id at 766-68. The state argued that price advertising would spur customers to seek
out the lowest prices, which would result in a decline in the relationship between pharmacist and
customer since building such rapport would become time-consuming and therefore too costly. Id
61. See id at 768.
62. See id at 769. Cf. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424
(1963) (ban on advertising of optometrists' services upheld when a challenge was based on due
process and equal protection).
63. See 425 U.S. at 770.
64. See id at 768. See note 49 supra.
65. See id at 769-70. The state seemed to fear that the low-cost, low-quality pharmacist
would drive the true professional out of business, but the Court refused to accept this logic, stating
that if the people are well enough informed, they will perceive their own best interests.
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afforded by the first amendment.66 In holding that commercial speech
was no longer unprotected under the first amendment, the Court none-
theless recognized that regulation of commercial speech was not pre-
cluded by its decision.67
REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A4. Focus on the Listener
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Virginia Pharmacy was the first major
indication by the Court that the interests of the listener could be con-
sidered in deciding whether to extend protection to a certain class of
speech.68 The free flow of commercial information was seen as neces-
sary to aid consumers in making intelligent, well-informed economic
decisions. 69 This informational interest was paramount in the Court's
consideration when deciding that price advertising should be permitted
and has been consistently considered in later cases dealing with the
degree of protection afforded to commercial speech. 0 In Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,71 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,72 and Friedman
v. Rogers, 3 the Court continued to emphasize that the kind of com-
mercial speech it envisioned as protected by the first amendment was
speech that conveyed information necessary to consumers to aid them
in their decisions in the marketplace.74 Clearly, not all commercial
speech is protected. 5 For example, the Court has noted that although
a great deal of advertising is not actually false, it may well be deceptive
or misleading.76 Much untruthful ideological speech, however, is pro-
tected in the interest of society as a whole,77 and the primary considera-
tion is to protect the right of the speaker. Since in commercial speech
the concern of the Court is the right of the listener, regulation of un-
truthful or deceptive advertising is a unique problem, not common to
other classes of speech, and the states are free to continue such regula-
66. See id at 759-60.
67. Id at 770-73. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion carefully delineated what he felt
to be the very narrow limits of the decision. He noted that the advertising of prepackaged drugs
was not the same as advertising by doctors and lawyers. 1d at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
68. See id at 763.
69. See id at 764-65.
70. See id at 765.
71. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
72. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
73. 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979).
74. See 433 U.S. at 374-75; 436 U.S. at 457-58; 99 S. Ct. at 893, 895.
75. See 425 U.S. at 770-71.
76. See id at 771.
77. See id at 771 & n.24; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961).
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tion.7" The constitutionality of such regulation, however, depends on
the status of protection afforded commercial speech.
B. Possible "Chill"
The initial interpretive response to the decision in Virginia Pharmacy
was that the decision gave commercial speech the same status as all
other protected speech.79 The decision may be read to state that there
is no longer a commercial speech exception to the first amendment.s0 If
this is an accurate interpretation, there is no longer a need to label
speech "purely commercial" to determine the extent of protection af-
forded by the first amendment, since it must be regulated using the
same criteria used to regulate any other class of protected speech. In
subsequent decisions, however, the Court has continued to refer to
commercial speech as a separate class."' In an oft-quoted footnote
from the Virginia Pharmacy decision, the Court admitted the existence
of "commonsense differences" between purely commercial speech and
other varieties that, while not justifying absolute prohibition, clearly
supported the conclusion that a different type of protection was neces-
sary for purely commercial speech.8 2 The clearest difference between
commercial and political speech is that advertising is the road to in-
creased profits. Because of this difference, the Court saw little likeli-
hood that regulation would chill and ultimately destroy commercial
speech8 3 and noted that the "greater objectivity and hardiness" of com-
mercial speech might also make the prohibition against prior restraints
inapplicable.8 4 It is important to observe, however, that the Court lim-
ited the holding in Virginia Pharmacy to price advertising by pharma-
cists.8
5
78. See 425 U.S. at 771. Advertising of illegal transactions continues to be unprotected. See
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The special
situation of the broadcast media permits a much greater degree of regulation. See Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aj'dsub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co.
v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
79. "After a confusing and unpopular history, the commercial speech doctrine is dead. Ad-
vertising is now recognized as a conveyor of information and is entitled to first amendment protec-
tion." Note, The Demise of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and the Regulation ofProfessional's
Advertising: The Virginia Pharmacy Case, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 245, 262 (1977).
80. See 425 U.S. at 762.
81. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
82. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
83. "Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its
being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely." Id
84. See id
85. "I think it important to note also that the advertisement of professional services carries
with it quite different risks from the advertisement of standard products." Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart wrote to affirm the validity of state and federal regulation of false or
deceptive advertising. See id. at 775-81 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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C. Interests to be Examined in Regulating Unsolicited Commercial
Telephone Calls
The Court, in Virginia Pharmacy, refused to allow the Common-
wealth to regulate its pharmacists by keeping consumers ignorant of
what was considered to be vital economic information.86 The value of
the speech was its purely commercial content since the speech allowed
economic choices to be made on the basis of more complete informa-
tion. The free flow of commercial information was found to be "indis-
pensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise
system" and indispensable to the formation of opinions of how that
system should be regulated.8 7
These interests are not inhibited by regulation of unsolicited com-
mercial telephone calls. Such regulation does not take the form of a
complete ban on the dissemination of information, but merely restricts
one means of that dissemination. The Court has carefully limited its
extension of first amendment protection to price advertising88 and as a
result much of the content of the restricted telephone calls may fall
outside the area protected under Virginia Pharmacy. Certainly a con-
sumer's right to know the information contained in these telephone
calls in order to make informed choices in the marketplace should be
protected, but some regulation must be permitted in order to prevent
intrusion upon those who do not wish to receive the information.
Essentially, the problem is not one of lack of necessary information
as in Virginia Pharmacy, but may, in fact, be one of the telephone sub-
scriber receiving more information than he or she sought or expected.
The subscriber, therefore, may seek some regulation of the quantity
and frequency with which the information is received.
TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS
Recognition of speech as within a protectible class does not preclude
all state regulatory activities. Protected commercial speech, like all
classes of protected speech, is subject to reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions.89 Traditionally, such restrictions must allow am-
ple alternative means of disseminating the speaker's message,90 be con-
tent neutral,91 and serve a significant governmental interest.92 These
86. See id at 763-65.
87. See id at 765.
88. Compare Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979) and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) with Obralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
39. See 425 U.S. at 771.
90. See text accompanying notes 114-124 infra.
91. See text accompanying notes 125-174 infra.
92. See text accompanying notes 175-220 infra.
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requirements are the elements of the equation that, when all are pres-
ent, will produce a constitutionally sound regulation. Thus, if a statute
is framed so as to comply with all of these requirements, it will with-
stand first amendment scrutiny.
In responding to a demand for regulation of protected speech, the
legislature must carefully consider the requirement that the regulation
be no more than a time, place, or manner restriction.93 This require-
ment was articulated as early as 1938 in Lovell v. City of Grion,94 in
which the Court suggested that an ordinance restricting the distribution
of literature with respect to time and place might be valid under certain
circumstances, 95 even though the particular ordinance under attack
could not survive challenge. 96
Time, place, and manner restrictions are permitted for various rea-
sons, the most common being the need for "traffic control."97 Recog-
nizing that two groups cannot occupy the same space at the same time,
the Court permits reasonable regulation of access to physical facili-
ties.98 Other regulations are permitted to control litter, prevent distur-
bances of the peace, and prevent potential nuisances.99 Time and place
are easily defined terms and cause few problems since those regulations
are readily identified."° On the other hand, restrictions of the manner
of speech present some difficulty in definition as well as recognition.
One suggested definition would limit the types of manner restrictions to
the
physical and procedural incidents of public expression that are
neither "time" nor "place"-for example, the size and number of
posters that can be displayed in certain locations, the volume of
sound amplification ... identification of persons soliciting funds,
methods of distributing literature, and the myriad other matters that
must be regulated in order effectively to regulate the speech situa-
tion.'lo
Time, place, and manner regulations that have been upheld by the
Court include an anti-noise ordinance aimed at preventing disruptions
93. See 425 U.S. at 771.
94. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
95. See id at 451.
96. See id The ordinance under attack prohibited all distribution without a permit issued by
the city manager, a situation the Court would not validate.
97. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 102-03
(1966).
98. Id; see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
99. See, eg., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
100. See O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate Resolution, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 88, 104
(1966).
101. Id
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 11
while a school is in session10 2 and an ordinance prohibiting the use of
sound amplifiers on vehicles.'0 3 A restriction on the use of the tele-
phone for advertising and sales is a manner restriction, closely analo-
gous to a restriction on the method of distributing literature, and such a
restriction must be reasonable if it is to be upheld by the Court.
A. Reasonableness
Reasonableness as applied to time, place, and manner restrictions
has been recognized as a flexible requirement, based on the nature of a
place and the pattern of its normal activities.10 4 It is the test used to
determine whether a time, place, or manner restriction will survive con-
stitutional scrutiny. The Court will "weigh heavily" the fact that com-
munication is involved in the activity to be regulated and require that
any such regulation be narrowly framed to further a legitimate state
interest.'0 5 Professor Charles Wright suggests that a part of the test is
ap opriateness: a regulation denying the right to someone to make
speeches in the reading room of the library is seen by the Court as
reasonable while prohibiting the same speeches in the park is not.'
0 6
A manner restriction of the use of the telephone, therefore, must be
framed as narrowly as possible to eliminate any unnecessary infringe-
ment of the speech rights of those who wish to use the telephone as an
advertising and sales device. A reasonable restriction might be one that
allows the telephone subscriber to determine whether he or she wishes
to receive unsolicited commercial telephone calls and merely provides
a means whereby the state can enforce that determination once it is
made. This kind of restriction would not operate as an absolute ban on
telephone sales, thus avoiding one of the problems of Virginia Phar-
macy.107 This position is supported by the decisions in Lamont v. Post-
master General'0 s and Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department.09 In Lamont, the Court invalidated a requirement that
an individual take affirmative action in order to receive certain mail.1 0
The government was not allowed to interrupt the flow of mail by re-
quiring the addressee to return a postcard stating a desire to have cer-
tain items delivered."' In Rowan, the Court was faced with the
102. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
103. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). But see Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
104. See 408 U.S. at 116; Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027,
1042 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
105. 408 U.S. at 116-17.
106. See Wright, supra note 104, at 1045. See also 408 U.S. at 116.
107. See notes 58-65 and accompanying text supra.
108. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
109. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
110. See 381 U.S. at 307.
111. See id at 305-07.
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opposite situation, a statute giving an individual the right to request
that certain items not be mailed to his or her home.I" Since the deci-
sion was left to the individual and the government became involved
only after the decision was reached, the Court upheld the statute.' 13 By
framing a statute regulating unsolicited commercial telephone calls so
that the regulation provides a restriction similar to that upheld by the
Court in Rowan, 114 the requirement of reasonableness when considered
alone should be satisfied. Reasonableness must also be considered as it
relates to the remaining elements-availability of ample alternative
means, content neutrality, and existence of a significant governmental
interest-since a regulation that does not satisfy them could be found
unreasonable.
B. Ample Alternative Means
The Court will invalidate a regulation of commercial telephone calls
if such a regulation effectively eliminates the only practical means of
communicating the message contained in the calls."1 5 This requirement
severely curtails the ability of the government to regulate certain kinds
of activity that are viewed as a unique means of distributing
messages." 6 In upholding an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solic-
itation of sales of goods,"I7 the Court indicated that its decision was in
part based on the fact that the usual methods of solicitation such as
mail, radio, periodicals, and local outlets were still available to solicit
sales. l8
Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro' 9 provided the Court
with an opportunity to address directly the requirement of ample alter-
native means of disseminating the content of a communication. The
township of Willingboro passed an ordinance that forbade the posting
of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on any homes other than model
homes.' 20 A unanimous Court struck down the ordinance, taking a
very practical approach to the question of whether ample alternative
112. 397 U.S. at 730.
113. See Id at 738-39.
114. There is some evidence that telephone marketers would support such a restriction, as it
does not completely prohibit the use of the telephone as an advertising tool. See A Revolt, supra
note 2, at 27.
115. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
116. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). Butsee Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
117. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
118. Seeid at 631-32.
119. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
120. Id at 86.
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means existed to advertise the availability of a house on the market.12 1
Even though other means of disseminating the information were avail-
able, the Court recognized that as a practical matter real estate is not
sold through the use of leaflets, sound trucks, or demonstrations. 22
The most realistic options, newspaper advertising and listing with
agents, were viewed by the Court as more costly, less likely to reach the
desired audience, and less effective in communicating the desired infor-
mation than lawn signs."2
What constitutes ample alternative means will vary with each factual
setting, with the Court looking at the specific target of the regulation
and trying to determine if the state has left the speaker with unwork-
able options. An ordinance restricting unsolicited commercial tele-
phone calls will clearly leave open ample alternative means for the
caller to communicate his or her message.' 24 The telephone is only one
of many effective sales devices. Given the vast reach of radio, televi-
sion, newspapers, magazines, billboards, and even the mail, restricting
access by the telephone would not remove an essential means of com-
munication from the advertiser. The problem of Linmark, the unique
nature of real estate sales, is not present when dealing with telephone
calls that advertise a variety of goods and services. Additionally, un-
like placing a "For Sale" sign on a lawn, telephone sales can be a costly
enterprise, and arguably, alternative means of reaching the consumer
are at least as effective as telephone sales.
Once the regulation of unsolicited commercial telephone calls has
been determined to be a reasonable restriction of the manner of speech,
one that does not eliminate all of the readily available means of deliv-
ering the caller's messages, satisfaction of the remaining two elements
of the equation, content neutrality and significant governmental inter-
est, will result in the ability of the state to regulate such calls.
C. Content Neutrality
1 From Mosely to American Mini Theatres
Although the concept of content neutrality was first articulated by
Justice Black, 125 the landmark decision embracing the concept as a re-
121. See id at 95.
122. See id at 93.
123. See id
124. When considering the requirement of ample alternative means, an additional justification
for limiting the regulation to commercial telephone calls is apparent. Political, religious, and
charitable groups very often lack the funds to utilize other means of communication, and polls
and broadcast ratings must often be taken much faster than door-to-door canvassing will permit.
125. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring). See generally Note, Constitutional Lan-First 4mendment-Content Neutrality, 28
CAsE W. Ras. L. Rlv. 456, 464-65 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Content Neutrali y].
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quirement appeared after he had left the Court, in Police Defpartment v.
Mosey. 126 Content neutrality was viewed as a provision required by
the first amendment, which allowed the government "no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or
its content." 127 For Justice Black this position was absolute,128 but Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion in Mosely recognized that there was not an ab-
solute ban on content distinctions but rather a presumption against
their validity, requiring them to survive strict scrutiny.
129
Three years after the Mosel, decision, in Erznoznik v. City of Jack-
sonville,' 30 an ordinance banning the showing of certain types of films
at drive-in theatres based on their content was invalidated by the
Court.31 The Court found that the state interest in preventing the
showing of these films outdoors was not sufficiently strong to satisfy the
"rigorous constitutional standards" that must be used to determine if a
regulation of expression is valid.' 32 The city was not allowed to shield
the public from the showing of nudity in films at drive-in theatres since
the interest of the city in regulating traffic was insufficient justification
for the content-based regulation of expression involved.' 33
The decision in Virginia Pharmacy accepted as fact that content neu-
trality was a requirement for the regulation of protected speech.' 34 Ex-
actly one month later, however, the Court decided Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc. ,'35 a case that involved a zoning ordinance restrict-
ing the location of adult theatres, defined as those that showed films
with a specified content.' 36 Unlike the finding in Erznoznik, a four-
person plurality in American Mini Theatres found that even though the
films were protected by the first amendment, their content could legiti-
mately be used to place them in a separate class, thus allowing the city
to regulate the location of the theatres based on the content of the films
shown. 37 Society's interest in the first amendment protection for these
films was viewed as being of a different and lesser magnitude than the
126. 408 U.S. 92 (1972); see Content Neutralip, supra note 125, at 466.
127. 408 U.S. at 95.
128. I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted
our Bill of Rights did all the "balancing" that was to be done in this field.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
129. 408 U.S. at 98-99.
130. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
131. See id at 217.
132. Id
133. See id at 215-17.
134. See 425 U.S. at 771.
135. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
136. The classification of a theatre as "adult" was determined by the content of the films
shown; they were defined as those depicting certain sexual activities or areas of the human anat-
omy. See id at 53 & n.5.
137. See id at 69-70
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interest in protecting political or ideological debate. 3 " The four jus-
tices viewed the ordinance as merely a place restriction 39 and justified
the absence of content neutrality by arguing that since content had
been allowed to determine the extent of constitutional shelter extended
to advertising in Virginia Pharmacy,140 it could be argued that there is a
concept of less-protected speech.'4 1 Implicit in this argument is the
conclusion that if a class of speech can be considered less-protected,
then a content-based regulation of such speech could be valid.1 42 Jus-
tice Powell, supplying the fifth vote to uphold the ordinance, viewed it
as an example of "innovative land-use regulation" with only incidental
first amendment concerns.143 Since there was no censorship of the con-
tent of the films and no limitation imposed on those who wished to
view them, the city was free to decide where to locate the theatres. 144
This view also treats the ordinance as a place regulation, aimed not at
speech but at conduct, since the activity was allowed to continue with
only the situs of the activity regulated. 145
Similarly, a restriction on unsolicited commercial telephone calls can
be viewed as a regulation aimed at conduct, not at speech, since it
would limit the manner in which commercial speech is presented, not
its content. In addition, following the inference from American Mini
Theatres,146 the regulation of unsolicited commercial calls is merely a
manner regulation that need not be content neutral since the content is
less protected speech under Virginia Pharmacy.47 Since the less pro-
tected status of commercial speech places unsolicited sales calls in a
separate class, 148 and society's interest in the first amendment protec-
tion of these calls is less than that of political or ideological debate, 149
the state could regulate such calls based on their content. Thus, regula-
tion of unsolicited commercial telephone calls will not necessarily fail
for lack of content neutrality. Further clarification of the status of com-
mercial speech can be gleaned from cases following Virginia Pharmacy.
138. See id at 70.
139. See id at 71.
140. See id at 68.
141. See id at 70; Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
142. Since full protection is not granted to commercial speech, the Court may allow the con-
tent of the speech to be examined. Price advertising was protected in Virginia Pharmacy, but
other commercial speech has not been protected by the Court. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S.
Ct. 887 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
143. See 427 U.S. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
144. See id at 78-79.
145. See id at 78-79, 84.
146. See text accompanying notes 134-142 supra.
147. See 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
148. See 427 U.S. at 69-70.
149. See id. at 70.
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2 Less Protected Commercial Speech
The next opportunity after Virginia Pharmacy for the Court to ad-
dress the issue of the limited protection of commercial speech was
presented in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,150 in which the Court found
that attorneys have the right to advertise routine legal services.151 In
deciding Bates, the Court relied on Virginia Pharmacy for the proposi-
tion that commercial speech has been extended some, but not absolute,
protection by the first amendment.'52 Once again, the Court gave
weight to the right of the consumer to have access to the price informa-
tion.153 The separate opinions of Chief Justice Burger' 54 and Justice
Powell,'" while not denying that commercial speech is protected to
some extent, would not go as far as the majority opinion in allowing
attorneys to advertise.156 Only Justice Rehnquist would extend no pro-
tection to purely commercial speech;' 5 7 the other eight justices envision
placing commercial speech at varying positions along the scale of first
amendment protection.' 58
That commercial speech will continue to be treated differently than
other classes of protected speech is clear, based on the two most recent
decisions of the Court addressing the issue of the extent of the protec-
tion afforded commercial speech by the first amendment. In Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association 59 a ban on direct client solicitation by at-
torneys was upheld, 160 the Court stating that commercial speech is pro-
tected "commensurate with its subordinate position" under the first
amendment.' 6' The commercial activity involved was deemed to be
potentially harmful to the public and could be prohibited. 62  The
Court also noted that in-person solicitation tended to demand an im-
150. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
151. The defendants, Bates and O'Steen, desired to provide basic legal services for those who
did not qualify for free legal services but who were not wealthy. Their clinic specialized in such
services as uncontested divorces, name changes, and wills. They discovered that their clinic could
not succeed without advertising. Id at 354.
152. Id at 380-81.
153. See id at 376-77.
154. Id at 386.
155. Id at 389.
156. They felt that legal services were not so routine that a standard fee could be advertised
without misleading the potential client. See id at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting),
391-95 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
157. Id at 404 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
158. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision and all the remaining Justices except Justice
Rehnquist joined in the decision in Virginia Pharmacy. 425 U.S. at 749. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist dissented on the first amendment issues in Bates. 433
U.S. at 352.
159. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
160. Id at 454.
161. Id at 456 (emphasis added).
162. See id at 461-62.
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mediate response, not allowing time for comparison or reflection. 163 A
prohibition of the use of trade names by optometrists was upheld by
the Court in Friedman v. Rogers,1' partly on the rationale that since
trade names may be used to mislead the public, the state may prohibit
their use.165 The information conveyed by a trade name was not the
same as that conveyed by the price advertising that was the subject of
the prohibitions of Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, and the Court had no
difficulty in distinguishing the information. 166
Both Ohralilc and Friedman indicate that commercial speech is con-
sidered less protected by the Court and that different standards are
used when examining regulations that affect commercial speech. 167
Both decisions also indicate that certain commercial speech may be
prohibited based on its content because of its "subordinate position"
under the first amendment.1 68 As in Ohralik the direct solicitation by
telephone, though not as potentially harmful as an attorney soliciting a
client, still may demand an immediate response, not allowing time for
comparison or reflection,169 and there is a possibility of misleading
statements and deception in telephone sales not unlike the Friedman
situation. 70 Thus, the increasing emphasis on the rights of the listener
indicate that the Court" would allow regulation of telephone cals in
order to protect those rights.
The decision of the Court in Rowan v. United States Post Office De-
partment'7 ' provides additional justification for the belief that a regula-
tion may be framed to apply only to commercial telephone calls.
Rowan was decided prior to Virginia Pharmacy but has been cited in
decisions subsequent to Virginia Pharmacy,17 2 indicating that its rea-
soning remains valid. The only restriction on the householder's deci-
sion to reject mailings allowed by the statute upheld in Rowan is that
the material sent to the home be an advertisement, a determination
made by looking to the content of the mailing.173 The regulation of the
unsolicited commercial telephone calls will require a similar determi-
nation. Thus under Friedman, Ohralik, and Rowan the state may regu-
163. See id at 457.
164. 99 S. Ct. 887 (1979).
165. See id at 895-96.
166. See id at 895.
167. See id at 894 & n.9; 436 U.S. at 455-56.
168. Both decisions upheld regulations that affected some commercial speech. Arguably, the
content of the speech determined whether the regulation in question applied.
169. 436 U.S. at 457.
170. 99 S. Ct. at 895-96.
171. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
172. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 86 n.5 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
173. See 397 U.S. at 739 & n.6; Note, FederalPandering.4dvertisements Statute. The Right of
Privacy versus the FirstAmendment, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 154 (1971).
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late a commercial speech activity based on the content of that speech
because of its less-protected status under the first amendment and be-
cause the paramount concern of the Court is the protection of the con-
sumer rather than the speaker.
A statute framed as a reasonable manner restriction that allows the
advertiser ample alternative means to advertise goods and services to
those who wish to buy will not withstand challenge unless it satisfies
the final requirement established by the Court: the statute must serve a
significant governmental interest. 74 Those clamoring for regulation of
unsolicited telephone calls have relied on a claim of the right to govern-
ment protection for the right of privacy. If there is a significant govern-
mental interest in protecting the right of privacy of the individual
telephone subscriber, the final requirement will be met.
D. Right of Privacy: A Signpicant Governmental Interest
A regulation that restricts protected speech may meet all the require-
ments discussed and still fail to serve a significant governmental inter-
est and will therefore be found invalid. This final element will
complete the equation since government has been prevented by the
Court from restricting speech where there is no governmental interest
being served by the regulation.175 The governmental interest to be
placed in the equation to determine the validity of a regulation of unso-
licited commercial telephone calls is the protection of the individual
telephone subscriber's right of privacy. 176 This phrase has become a
magic talisman, argued in a variety of situations. Many different inter-
ests have been lumped together under the banner of privacy,17 7
prompting Justice Rehnquist to observe that the decisions in this area
"defy categorical description."' 78 Most of the decisions, however, may
be placed into one of three broad classifications. 179 One group of deci-
sions has found a right of privacy based on the fourth amendment
guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, 80 and
another group has found a right of privacy encompassing certain fun-
174. See 425 U.S. at 771.
175. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
176. See generally Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Maltter of State Constitutional Law, 5
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TowardPrivacy].
177. See Comment, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CALiF. L. Rav. 1447, 1447-48 (1976).
178. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
179. See generally Toward Privacy, supra note 176, at 651-59.
180. The Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to
privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with pri-
vacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other
forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person's general right to pri-
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damental personal rights,'18 but neither has been extended to encom-
pass areas of first amendment concern. The third classification is those
decisions in which the Court has been willing to protect privacy inter-
ests in cases of intrusions into the home."2
L Privacy in the Home
The decisions that have found a right of privacy in the home do not
rely on a constitutional right of privacy, but rather on what Justice
Brandeis called the "right to be let alone."' 8 3 This right is based upon
the state's ability to legislate against trespass.184 Some of the earliest
cases dealing with this problem are those concerning the rights of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses to distribute their literature to individual homes. Mar-
tin v. City of Struthers'" involved an ordinance prohibiting the door-
to-door distribution of literature. The city tried to justify the ordinance
on the basis of crime prevention, prevention of annoyance to house-
holders, and protection of the right of privacy.'8 6 In overturning the
ordinance, the Court emphasized that the decision to refuse to permit
such distribution properly belonged to the householder, 18 7 who was re-
quired to assert the right of privacy by taking affirmative steps to pro-
tect the right, such as posting "No Trespassing" signs, in order to gain
the protection of the state for the right.18 8 In Breard v. Alexandria
t8 9
the opposite result was reached by the Court, and the householder's
right of privacy prevailed over the first amendment rights of a door-to-
door salesperson.1 90 The Court stated that the home should be a place
where one may shut out "uninvited strangers expound[ing] distasteful
doctrines. . . . Freedom of the home is as important as freedom of
speech."'191 Although the Court emphasized the distinction between
vacy---is right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property and
of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). See also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249-
53 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (refusing to allow a constitutional privacy claim to encompass
a regulation of hair length); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975), a)7d425
U.S. 901 (1976) (application of sodomy statute to consenting adults in private upheld).
181. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The Court has limited the constitutional protection to what it sees as fundamental per-
sonal rights relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. See Toward Privacy, supra note 176, at 670.
182. The home seems to have a special significance to the Court and has become one of the
most clearly delineated zones of privacy. See 397 U.S. at 737; 341 U.S. at 644-45.
183. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
184. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 & nn.10-13 (1943).
185. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
186. See id at 144.
187. See id at 148.
188. See id
189. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
190. See id at 644.
191. Id at 639 n.27.
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the religious literature of Martin and'the magazines of Breard,92 a dis-
tinction of questionable validity since Virginia Pharmacy,'93 the Court
did recognize the right of an individual to build a wall around the
home to keep out unwanted people. 19 4 From that position, it is a short
step to recognize the right of an individual to keep out unwanted
messages however they are disseminated.
2. Rowan v. United States Post Office Department
A key consideration for the Court in determining whether the state
may protect the right of privacy of an individual at the risk of infring-
ing on the first amendment rights of another has become the site of the
invasion."19 There is an increased willingness on the part of the mem-
bers of the Court to allow regulation of intrusions into the home but to
refuse to permit similar regulations of intrusions elsewhere. 196 Rowan
v. United States Post Office Department"97 states that a householder has
the right to determine what material enters the zone of privacy sur-
rounding the home.198 In Rowan, a group of direct mail advertisers
challenged a federal statute that permitted individuals to request that a
particular sender refrain from mailing advertisements to their homes
because such mailings were found to be offensive by that individual. 199
Once the initial determination was made by the recipients that the ma-
terial was offensive, a procedure existed whereby the government could
enforce the desires of the individual requesting termination of such
mailings and could punish persons continuing those mailings after
proper notice.10° Looking to the right of an individual to decide
whether to allow a distributor of literature to call at his or her home,
the Court refused to allow any greater protection for material con-
192. Since selling from door to door was "commercial" the Court had no difficulty with this
distinction. See 341 U.S. at 642-43.
193. Since Breard's holding on the first amendment issue rests squarely on the premise that
such speech was commercial, the decision in Virginia Pharmacy arguably overruled it. See 425
U.S. 758-60.
194. See 319 U.S. at 148.
195. See note 182 supra.
196. The Court has been receptive to the plight of the captive audience outside the home as
well. Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding prohibition of politi-
cal advertising on transit system cars); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ban on
sound trucks emitting "loud and raucous" noises). But cf. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451 (1952) (holding that radios in buses do not constitute an invasion of privacy, since there
is no right of privacy in a bus equal to that in the home); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)
(invalidating an ordinance requiring a license issued by the chief of police in order to use sound
amplifiers in a public place).
197. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
198. Rowan was cited as authority for the proposition that there is an area of privacy around
the home in FCC v. Pac#Fca Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748, 759 (1978).
199. See 397 U.S. at 729. See generally 39 U.S.C. §3008 (1970) (former §4009).
200. See 39 U.S.C. §3008 (1970).
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signed to the mail.20 ' To allow greater protection would be to permit a
form of trespass, a result found to be untenable since the Constitution
guarantees only the right to speak, not the right to force others to lis-
ten.202 The right of the individual to be let alone in this situation out-
weighs the right of the advertiser to enter the home to communicate his
or her message.20 3 While the disturbance caused by the receipt of mail
may be substantially less than that caused by the doorbell, any un-
wanted intrusion was viewed as unacceptable once the choice was
made not to permit it.2"
Decisions subsequent to Rowan have continued to look to the site of
the invasion to determine whether the first amendment claims are supe-
rior to the privacy interests. In Cohen v. Calfornia,20 5 the Court over-
turned the conviction of a man wearing a jacket that had "Fuck the
Draft" written on it, saying that the unwilling viewer could avert his or
206 ~T1te207her eyes. While there was sympathy for the plight of the viewer,
the existence of the option to walk away justified the refusal to allow
the state to curtail such speech .20  The same rationale prevailed in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,20 9 in which the Court found that the
viewer offended by the content of certain films could turn away and
refused to allow the state to prohibit the showing of the films. 210
In the celebrated "Seven Dirty Words" case2"1 the Court was again
faced with the conflict between the first amendment rights of a speaker
and the right of privacy of the potential listener.21 2 The Federal Com-
munications Commission was allowed to prohibit the broadcasting of
material that admittedly was not obscene, in part because the broadcast
entered the home,21 3 where the "individual's right to be let alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."214 Five
201. 397 U.S. at 737.
202. Id
203. See Id at 736.
204. See id at 736-37.
205. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
206. mhe mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve auto-
matically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense.... [Wle are often
"captives" outside the sanctuary of the home.
Id at 21.
207. See id at 21-22.
208. The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Id at 21.
209. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
210. Id at 212.
211. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
212. See id at 748.
213. Id at 748, 759. The Court used this reasoning even though the complaint was lodged by
someone who had heard the broadcast on his car radio. Id at 729-30.
214. Id at 748.
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justices,21 5 in the two opinions that formed the plurality, felt that
Rowan allows state regulation to restrict access to the home by broad-
casters as well as mailers.216
These decisions clearly indicate that the Court is almost certain to
find that there is a significant governmental interest in protecting an
individual's right to control who or what may enter his or her home.217
The ringing of a telephone is as great a disturbance as the ringing of a
doorbell and is virtually impossible to ignore. Unlike the situation in
Cohen, in which the unwilling viewer could avert his or her eyes, there
is no means to avert one's ears from a ringing telephone.2 t8 The infer-
ence from Rowan and Pacfca is that even protected speech can be
regulated if it invades the home.21 9 Whether the speech is a nonob-
scene radio broadcast, the receipt of offensive material through the
mails, or an unsolicited commercial telephone call, the Court would
still find that the right to be let alone outweighs the first amendment
considerations. Indeed, in light of the less protected status of commer-
cial speech, the Court is certain to find that telephone calls can be regu-
lated. A statute similar to that upheld in Rowan, providing for a
method of refusing unsolicited telephone calls initiated by the tele-
phone subscriber rather than the state, would provide the required de-
gree of protection for the consumer without destroying the first
amendment rights of the seller who wishes to use the telephone as an
advertising tool in his or her business. 220
215. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Powell, and Blackmun joined in
the two opinions.
216. A parallel was drawn between indecent language on the radio and an indecent telephone
call.
To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears inde-
cent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the
caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place.
438 U.S. at 748-49.
217. The California constitution expressly provides that all people have a right to pursue and
obtain privacy. CAL. CONsT., art I, §1. Using this provision, there is an even stronger argument
under state law that protecting privacy is a significant governmental interest.
218. See 403 U.S. at 21.
219. See 397 U.S. at 737. The Court stated that:
[Tlhe power of the householder.. . is unlimited; he or she may prohibit the mailing of a
dry goods catalog because he objects to the contents--or indeed the text of the language
touting the merchandise.
Id.; see 438 U.S. At 746-47. The Court in Pacfca assumed that the radio monologue would be
protected in "other contexts" but found that it was not "entitled to absolute protection under all
circumstances." Id.
220. It should be noted that Rowan allows action after a particular advertisement has been
found offensive. The telephone privacy statute must be wider in scope and encompass all adver-
tisers whose calls fit the definition. This can be justified by looking to the difficulty of individually
notifying each potential caller of the desire not to receive the calls.
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CONCLUSION
This comment has focused on the first amendment requirements
enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy
to enable a statute regulating commercial speech to survive a constitu-
tional challenge based on the freedom of speech of the advertiser.22 1
Regulation of unsolicited commercial telephone calls must take the
form of a reasonable manner restriction. In addition, although the reg-
ulation need not be content neutral, it must allow ample alternative
means of communication and serve a significant governmental inter-
est. 2  A statute regulating unsolicited commercial telephone calls that
satisfied these requirements was proposed during the 1978 session of
the California Legislature.2 2 3 This indicates that there has been some
response to the demand for regulation, but the bill failed passage.
Hearings have been held by the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 24 and action by that body could alleviate some of the problems
telephone subscribers face, but the most effective action would be the
enactment of legislation allowing the telephone subscriber to turn off
the calls at the source. Such legislation would provide that the individ-
ual who pays for the telephone service could make the decision not to
receive unsolicited commercial telephone calls and thus would provide
protection for the privacy of those individuals who choose to build a
wall to keep out unwelcome messages, no matter how valuable.
The California Legislature has responded to a limited part of the
problem by regulating automatic dialing-announcing devices.225 While
this is certainly a worthwhile first step, the problem of "junk calls" will
continue to grow unless some power is placed in the hands of the tele-
phone subscriber to refuse to accept these calls. By carefully examining
the limits on permissible regulation of commercial speech, it is possible
to frame a regulation that places the solution to the problem in the
hands of the targets of such advertising, rather than one that allows the
state to regulate or prohibit such calls. This is in keeping with the phi-
losophy of Virginia Pharmacy that protection of commercial speech
should benefit the consumer and not the seller. Each individual should
have the power to hang a "No Trespassing" sign on the telephone with-
out destroying the right of the advertiser to speak. At least in the home,
221. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
222. See text accompanying notes 108-220 supra.
223. SB 1352, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, Jan. 10, 1978.
224. See Public Utils. Comm'n Decision No. 89397 (Sept. 19, 1978) (copy on file at the Pain
Law Journal).
225. CAL. PUB. UTto. CODE §§2821-2825; see 10 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1978 CALI-
FORNIA LEGISLATION 382 (1979).
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the state should be willing to protect the right of the individual not to
listen.
Trude McMahan Morris
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